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STUDENT NOTES

else ordinary care to avoid injuring plaintiff, after he discovered,
or by the exercise of ordinary care, could have discovered, her
peril, and that by such failure, if any, she was thereby injured, you
will find for the plaintiff."
No clearer statement of the humanitarian doctrine could be desired. Yet the Court, in that case, termed it the humanitarian or last
clear chance doctrine, and cited in support the Cumberland Grocery
6
Company case supra, and the Williams Motor Company case, which
clearly applies the humanitarian doctrine.
7
In a recent case, the Kentucky Court approved the humanitarian
doctrine in its application to railroads, but refused to allow plaintiff
to benefit thereby under that particular set of facts. The Court there
restricted the doctrine to longitudinal passways sufficiently used to
require operators of trains to anticipate the presence of persons on
the tracks at those points. It would seem that such restriction is in
keeping with the cardinal requirement of the humanitarian doctrine
that defendant be under some duty, the breach of which may constitute
lack of ordinary care in discovering a negligent plaintiff's peril.
Again, in Kinsella et al. v. Meyer's Admr.,28 the Court framed an instruction to be used in the second trial which, it is submitted, is a perfect
enunciation of the principles of the humanitarian doctrine. Yet the
Court said that the facts presented "a situation that calls for the 'last
clear chance doctrine'.
It is submitted that the real distinction to be made between the
doctrine of last clear chance and the humanitarian doctrine is that
under the latter plaintiff is actively negligent, not helpless, and could
by waking up to his condition, remove himself from danger, while
defendant is unaware of plaintiff's peril, yet if he had used care he
could have discovered plaintiff's condition in time to avoid the injury.
It Is submitted that it is a matter of practical importance that the distinction between these two doctrines be maintained, since it is evident
that a plaintiff might be denied a recovery under the doctrine of last
clear chance, and yet be entitled to a judgment under the humanitarian
doctrine If defendant is guilty of a breach of a duty to keep a lookout.
STEE WHITE.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SOVEREIGN WAIVING PRIVILEGE
IMMUNITY FROM SUIT CAN LIMIT THE AMOUNT TO
BE RECOVERED

OF

A recent Kentucky case' upheld a statute permitting a motorist
who collided with a truck operated by an employee of the State Highway Commission to sue the Commonwealth for recovery of not more
than $6,000. The court held that such a statute did not violate a con16251 Ky. 557, 65 S. W. (2d) 688 (1933), cited supra, n. 11.
1TCincinnati, N. 0. & T. P. Ry. v. Wallace's Admr., 267 Ky. 661, 103
S. W. (2d) 91 (1937).
18267 Ky. 508, 102 S. W. (2d) 974 (1937) (automobile-pedestrian

ase).

Commonwealth v. Daniel, 266 Ky. 285, 98 S. W. (2d) 897 (1936).
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stitutional provision 2 prohibiting the General Assembly from limiting
the amount to be recovered for injuries to persons or property saying
that without the enabling act the plaintiff had no remedy since immunity from suit was a privilege which the sovereign could either
refuse to waive or waive at its pleasure and with such restrictions as
it saw fit to impose.
It is a well established rule both generally' and in Kentucky' that
the state by reason of its sovereignty cannot be sued in its own courts
or in any other unless it has expressly consented to such suit except of
course where the constitution allows it to be made a party or where it
may be made a party in the Supreme Court of the United States.0
But the immunity of the state from suit can be surrendered by the
General Assembly and it may direct in what manner and in what
courts suits may be brought against the Commonwealth. 0
Moreover it has been held that the right to sue the state is a
matter of legislative grace and therefore the extent of the recovery and
the manner of proceeding are to be governed by the terms of the
grant7 In addition the cases seem to be almost unanimous in their
holding that the state can lay down any terms it sees fit to impose.'
And even though the state consents to suit this is not a contract
and the consent can be repealed or modified at any time at the dis2 Ky. Const., Sec. 54.
3 State v. Sharp, 21 Ariz. 424, 189 Pac. 631 (1920); Hampton v.
State Board of Education of Florida, 90 Fla. 88, 105 So. 323 (1925);
State v. Liberty Oil Co., Ltd., 154 La. 267, 97 So. 438 (1923); Knights
v. Burrell, 236 Mass. 336, 128 N. E. 637 (1920); Mississippi Centennial
Exposition Co. v. Luderbach, et al., 123 Miss. 828, 86 So. 517 (1920);
State v. Woodruff, 150 So. (Miss.) 760 (1933); Bow v. Plumber, 79
N. H. 23, 104 Atl. 35 (1918); Di Marco v. State, 180 N. Y. S. 500 (1920);
James Stewart & Co. v. State, 201 N. Y. S. 334 (1923); Scales v. City
of Winston-Salem, 189 N. C. 469, 127 S. E. 543 (1925); Collins v. Commonwealth, 262 Pa. 572, 106 AtI. 229 (1919); Commonwealth v. Ferries
Co., 120 Va. 827, 92 S. E. 804 (1917).
'Ketterer's Administrator v. State Board of Control, etc., 131 Ky.
287, 115 S. W. 200 (1909); Zoeller v. State Board of Agriculture, 163
Ky. 446, 173 S. W. 1143 (1915); Hunt Forbes Construction Co. v.
Robinson, 227 Ky. 138, 12 S. W. (2d) 303 (1928); Taylor v. Westerfield,
233 Ky. 619, 26 S. W. (2d) 557 (1930); Board of Councilmen City of
Frankfort v. State Highway Commission, et al., 236 Ky. 253, 32 S. W.
(2d) 1008 (1930); Pennington's Administrator v. Commonwealth, 242
Ky. 527, 46 S. W. (2d) 1079 (1932); Kentucky State Park Commission
v. Wilder, 256 Ky. 313, 76 S. W. (2d) 4 (1934); Kentucky State Park
Commission v. Wilder, 260 Ky. 190, 84 S. W. (2d) 38 (1935).
5U. S. Const., Art. III, Sec. 2, par. 1; U. S. Const., Art. XI; Hans v.
Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1, 10 Sup. Ct. 504 (1890).
OKy. Const., See. 231.
7Commonwealth v. Stevens, 3 Ky. L. Rep. 165 (1881); Commonwealth v. Chevis, 4 Ky. L. Rep. 892 (case 2; 1883); see Pennington's Administrator v. Commonwealth, 242 Ky. 527, 530 (1932).
'Lemon v. Commonwealth, 236 Mass. 599, 129 N. E. 382 (1921);
Brown v. Ford, 112 Miss. 678, 73 So. 722 (1917); Ross v. State, 173
N. Y. S. 656 (1919); Commonwealth v. Ferries, 120 Va. 827, 92 S. E.
804 (1917).
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cretion of the state even after judgment is rendered since such a judg9
ment cannot be collected by execution; it remaining wholly with the
state as to whether it will provide for its payment or refuse to do so.
In conclusion, the principal case apparently reaches the right
result in holding that immunity from suit is a privilege which the
sovereign may waive at its pleasure and upon such terms as it sees
fit, even to the extent of limiting the amount to be recovered in the
action allowed. It would seem however that the fear of the legislature
that the plaintiff might recover an excessively large judgment was not
well founded in this case since the jury found for the plaintiff in the
sum of $3,000, only one-half of the limit fixed by the act.

B. T.

MoYNAHANT, Jn.

'Westinghouse Electric & Manufacturing Co. v. Chambers, 169
Cal. 131, 145 Pac. 1025 (1915); Meyer v. State Land Settlement, 286
Pac. (Cal.) 743 (1930); State v. Woodruff, 150 So. (Miss.) 760 (1933);
Stuart v. Smith-Courtney Co., 123 Va. 231, 96 S. E. 241 (1918).

